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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
S'1'.\1,E OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ~ 
~ vs. Case No. 9939. \\'ILLIAM KEITH BURRIS, Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE ISSUES 
INVOLVED 
This matter comes before the court upon an informa-
tion charging the defendant with Bastardy, charging in 
effect that as the result of acts of sexual intercourse on or 
about the :.!nd day of :F"ebruary, 1962, and on or about the 
11th day of February, 1962, in Cedar City, Iron County, 
Utah. \vith one Bonnie Ann Bauer, an unmarried female, 
. said Bonnie Ann Bauer became pregnant and that the 
defendant \Vas the father of said child. 
A plea of not guilty was e·ntered by the defendant, 
and after many delay~. defendant \vas tried in December 
of 1962 before an Iron Couty jury \Vhich unanimously found 
him guilty. Thereafter an order '"as filed by the court on 
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2 
or about the 14th day of February, 1963. Judg1nent was 
imposed by the District Court of Iron County, Utah. From 




rrHE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR. CHANGE IN VENUE. 
On the 12th day of April, 1962, the defendant caused to 
be prepared a motion for change of venue, which was filed 
on the 13th day of April, 1962, and \V hich was argued on a 
regular law and motion day thereafter. rrhe court denied 
the motion for change of venue. The circumstances of this 
motion for change of venue \Vere very similar to the old 
case of State of Utah vs. Brasch and Sullivan that \vas 
before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah and the 
United States Supreme Court several times, in which a mo-
tion for change of venue was denied by the trial court by 
and for the reason that it was not properly supported. In 
the Brasch and Sullivan case, the only information that 
could be made available, because of the refusal of people 
to sign statements and affidavits, was the affidavit of 
counsel as to the effort that he had made, and the reply he 
had received. Thereafter, after spending two days and 
going through approximately 120 jurors and failing to get 
a jury because of the prejudice that was shown in the pros-
pective jurors, said motion was reinitiated and was allowed. 
In the case at bar, a motion f,or change of venue was sup-
ported only by the affidavit of the defendant, which showed 
without any question that the matter had received com-
plete publicity throughout the county, and that it was im-
possible to call a jury trial on this item. The trial court 
denied the motion for change of venue, and erred in so 
doing. The minutes of the court reveal that the jury was 
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out less than 20 n1inutes and could not possibly have con-
sidered the evidence during that time as well as organize. 
Fnder these conditions, there is no question that the jury's 
mind was made up prior to trial, and that the trial court 
erred in failing to grant the motion for change of venue. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS WERE DENIED BY TRIAL 
COURT'S FAILING TO GRANT IMMEDIATE TRIAL. 
It is noted that the alleged acts of sexual intercourse 
were on the ~nd of February, 1962, and the 11th of Febru-
ary, 1962. The complaint \Vas filed in March, 1962, and a 
warrant of arrest was issued on the 16th day of March, 
1962, and \Vas delivered to the sheriff on the 20th day of 
l\larch, 1962, and arrest was made on that day. On the day 
of arrest, had an act of sexual intercourse occurred on 
the 2nd day of February, 1962, and the complaina·nt was 
pregnant therefrom, said pregnancy on the date of arrest 
was approximately six or seven \veeks. A preliminary 
hearing was held on this matter at the request of the de-
fendant on the 26th day of !\larch, 1962, and same was 
bound over to the District Court. The defendant appeared 
in the District Court in April of 1962 on this matter, and 
thereafter, on the 4th day of May, 1962, caused to be made 
a demand for imn1ediate trial which was filed and served 
on the 7th day of May, 1962. The trial court denied same 
on the basis that there could not be a trial until there was 
a child. 
Both the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, speaking of rights of an 
accused person, guarantee a speedy public trial. This is 
accomplished in Amendment VI to the Constitution of the 
l.Jnited States, one of the amendments that constitute the 
Bill of Rights: "In all crilninal prosecutions, the accused 
~hall ha \·e the right to a speedy and public trial." And in 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 112, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
the same language is used, "to have a speedy public trial.., 
In both instances, the terminology is used in criminal pro-
secutions. This again raises the question as to whether or 
not a bastardy prosecution is a crilninal prosecution. \Vhile 
there are cases of that nature which hold that for certai'n 
purposes it is not a criminal prosecution, at the same time 
it is tried by the State, in the name of the State, by an in-
formation filed by the District Attorney, and in n1ost in-
stances, the procedure that is followed is the criminal pro-
cedure rather than civil procedure. Under these circum-
stances, when the trial court denied the demand for im-
mediate trial for the defendant William Keith Burris, it 
failed to protect his constitutional rights. 
POINT Ill 
THE TRIAL JUDGE INSTRUCTED THE JURY TO 
DISREGARD SOME OF THE EVIDENCE. 
In the above entitled matter, during the trial many of 
the proceedings were put into evidence, the purpose being 
to show that the prosecutrix had made many conflicting 
statements as to when the alleged actual sexual intercourse 
took place. Both the complaint, the amended complaint 
and the information were placed in evidence for this pur-
pose. Thereafter, in Instruction No. 8, the trial court gave 
the strict instruction to the effect that pleadings were to 
serve as a means of placing a matter before the court, and 
that these items were not evidence. However, when the 
documents themselves had been entered in evidence, and 
copies of the documents \Vere entered as exhibits, then 
and under these conditions, the court's instruction No. 8 
became improper, and amounted to an instruction to the 
jury to disregard a portion of the defendant's evidence. Any 
instruction that instructs a jury to disregard evidence that 
has been admitted as evidence is improper. This item alone 
should be the basis for reversal. 
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POINT IV 
'rl-IE JURY ~_,AILED TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE. 
Therl' is no question that the jury had entered the 
trial \vith its mind already 1nade up due to the local pub-
licity on this matter, and it is noted that the jurors were 
discussing this matter long before the State's case was 
completed, and had made up its mind prior to the com-
pletion of the case of the State. This information is set 
forth in the transcript on Page 113, Line 16; remarks made 
by one of the jurors named Stapley had been overheard 
in the hall during recess. This matter was brought to the 
court's attention, and upon being questioned by the court, 
Juror Stapley answered, "I did make the remark in the 
hall as ,,.e \\·as coming in that \Ve did get a little tired 
:'itting here yesterday listeni'ng to cross examination and 
that was all that was said." 
Bearing in mind that the transcript of the preliminary 
hearing \vas entered in evidence, and the jury was out less 
than 20 minutes, there is no question that the jury had 
made up its mind long before submission to the jury, and 
had 1nade up its mind prior to the trial and resented any 
time spent on the matter. 
POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE DID ~OT JUSTIFY A CONVIC-
TION. 
As the trial court's rule, it is the State's duty to pre-
sent a preponderance of evidence in connection with this 
matter. The State did not at any time present a preponder-
ance of evidence, and the evidence as presented by the 
State did not any any time justify a conviction of the de-
fendant in connection \vith this matter. 
There is no question that Miss Bauer, the prosecutrix, 
made several conflicting statements as to when the alleged 
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acts of sexual intercourse took place, which should entirely 
discredit her testimony. In the first place, according to her 
testimony, both in the preliminary hearing and the trial, 
and the transcript of the preliminary hearing was subinit-
ted to the jury, Miss Bauer went to Dr. Williams two or 
three weeks after the alleged act of intercourse. At that 
time she told him that the act of intercourse was on the 
4th of February. This may be found in the transcript of 
the preliminary hearing at Page 15, Line 24, "she mention-
ed that she'd had intercourse, I believe, it was the 4th of 
February. That's the only date she mentioned to me." 
The complaint which was entered in evidence was 
sworn to by Miss Bauer and states that there was an act 
of sexual intercourse o~ or between the 2nd day of Feb-
ruary and the 11th day of February, 1962. At a later time 
she told two individuals there \Vas only one act if sexual 
intercourse. This is found in the transcript of the prelimin~ 
ary hearing on Page 61, Line 1, "Q-And you told them 
specifically that there was only one act of sexual inter-
course, didn't you? A-1 told the1n that at the time." 
Also, when Miss Bauer first told her parents concern-
ing the alleged acts of sexual intercourse, she told them 
the act took place on differents days from those she has 
stated in the complaint. On 26 March, 1962, when her 
mother was testifying in relation to the preliminary hear-
ing, Page 68. Line 29, Q-And did she tell you there had 
been more than one time?" This discussion continue on 
Page 69, Line 1, "A-No, not right then. She just told us 
when it happened. Q-And when did she say? A-She said 
it was Friday at his home. Q-What date \vould that be? 
A-1 don't remember the dates. Q-And when she first 
told you about it, it would have been somewhere near the 
last of February or early in March? A-It was-it would 
be the last of February, yes. Q-lt was definitely after the 
11th, was it? A-Yes." 
It was rather disconcerting that this discussion took 
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place on the 26th of March in the preliminary hearing on 
the above entitled matter, in which a young lady tells her 
tnother she is pregnant from an act of intercourse on a Fri-
day, and has made this statement within a month of the 
time of the alleged acts of sexual intercourse, and an ex-
amination of the 1962 calendar for February reveals the 
9th of February was a Friday, and Mrs. Bauer called Mr. 
Burris about Friday, Feb. 9, 1962. Under these circum-
stances, where a young lady tells her mother one date, the 
doctor another, signs a complaint to the fact that it was be-
hveen the 2nd of February and the 11th of February, and 
then signs an amended complaint to the effect that it was 
on the 2nd of February and the 11th of February, It can-
not help but lead one to the question as to whether or not 
the act every took place at all. c·ertainly these dates were 
much better remembered in February and March immed-
iately after the act, if there was one, than in December af-
ter a child had been born. Certainly the doctor's bei'ng told 
the 4th of February raises the question as to when the act 
took place. History is replete \vith instances in which a 
young lady becoming pregnant looks around to see who 
the best catch is. In this insta·nce, having told her mother 
that it was the 9th of February, finding out the defendant 
could account for himself on the 9th; then switching to the 
4th of February, and finding out the defendant could ac-
count for himself on the 4th; then switching to a double 
occasion on the 2nd and 11th of February, after having told 
t\\·o other individuals, same being her bishop and a stake 
president, that it \vas a single act, the question is raised 
as to whether or not she knows when said alleged act of 
intercourse took place, and if so, when? 
Also, the testimony of Bruce Decker, which is in no 
\Vay contested, raises a serious question as to whether or 
not Miss Bauer was in Cedar City on the night of the 2nd 
of February, 1962. In the transcript of the trial on Page 91, 
Line 29, in response to a question, "Did you see the basket-
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ball game between Cedar and St. George that \vas played 
in St. George," Miss Bauer answered, "Yes, I went to one 
game there." The testimony of Bruce Decker who was the 
coach of the team, to the effect that his team played in 
St. George on 2 February, 1962, is found in the transcript 
of the trial on Page 172, commencing on Line 13, to and 
including Line 3 on Page 174. One cannot help wondering 
as to the authenticity and reliability of Miss Bauer's tes-
timony pertaining to the alleged act of sexual Intercourse 
in Cedar City the evening of the 2nd of February, 1962, 
and her testimony that she saw the ball game at St. 
George, which according to the records of Mr. Decker, was 
played in St. George on the 2nd of February. 
Also, the probability of conception under the circun1-
stances related by Miss Bauer lends very little creditabili-
ty to her testimony. Although in the preliminary hearing 
Miss Bauer testified that did climax as part of the act of 
sexual Intercourse, Dr. Graff said that this could not hap-
pen. The testimony of Miss Bauer to this effect is found in 
the transcript of the preliminary hearing on Page 39, Line 
23, where in response to the question, "What do you mean 
by 'we did finish?', she answered, "Well, we went to the 
climax." From this point on in the transcript of the pre-
liminary hearing, to li'ne 8 on Page 40, a good deal of de-
tail was gone into by the cross-examiner to make certain 
that this testimony was not a mistake. It became quite ap-
parent that the young lady meant what she said. Dr. A. 
LaMar Graff, Jr., at the time of the trial testified, in his 
opinion, to the effect that there is ·no possibility of a female 
having a climax as part of her first sexual act. This is 
found commencing at Page 221, Line 27, being a question 
and ans\ver and the next question and answer, commenc-
ing "Now, Doctor, from a medical standpoint, what is the 
probability that a female will climax on her first sexual 
act?, and ending, "If an opinion means anything, I'd say 
it was nil." Also, the medical testimony i'n connection with 
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this matter is such that there appears to be very little prob-
ability that there was any conception or could have been 
conception at the tin1e testified by Miss Bauer. Under the 
circumstances of this matter, it is necessary to entirely 
discount the testimony of Dr. Williams because of admit-
ted prejudice against the defendant. This prejudice is 
found in the transcript of the trial at Page 151, Line 6, "Q 
-Doctor, have you ever objected to your daughter going 
out with Mr. Burris? A-Yes." It is further apparent that 
there was a definite prejudice on the part of Dr. Williams 
in his various attempts to say that the child was born 
premature. A very definite answer on the question can be 
found in the transcript on Page 141, Line 10, 'Q-Now, 
Doctor, in that first paragraph about 14 lines down, there 
is a sentence, 'There is general agreement that 2500 grams 
(3 pounds eight ounces) should make the upper boundary 
of prematurity, that is, the borderline between a prema-
ture and a mature infant." Would you tell us what that 
means please?" A-"Well, it doesn't mean anythi'ng speci-
fic." From that point on, there is a great deal of vague 
testimony from Dr. Williams to the effect that the child 
\vas premature. However, there is no question that this is 
an afterthought. Although Dr. Williams attended at the 
deliYery, the records of the delivery room were brought 
into the courtroom and identified by the custodian. Then 
Berniece Bulloch, who \Vas a nurse in the delivery room 
and who made the records, and show definitely that at 
the time of the birth the entry was made on the records, 
"Apparently normal male child." This is found in the 
transcript of the trial, Page 209, Line 12, and stopping on 
Page 210, Line 12. Although Dr. Williams supervised the 
delivery, no evidence of abnormality was recorded at the 
time of delivery, and no record was made of same in any 
hospital record, and at the same time a question comes 
up, \vhy was Dr. \Villian1s, even though present, attempt-
ing to show an apparently normal male child was in effect 
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premature? The answer is, of course, the child was born 
on 14 October, 1962, and could just as easily have been 
conceived a month earlier than Miss Bauer testified. The 
testimony of Dr. Graff on this point, Page 221 of the 
transcript, was to the effect that in a norn1al situation 
with the last menstrual period having commenced on 22 
January, the child \vould have been born between the 22nd 
of October and the 5th of November; also that if the nor-
mal period last named commenced on the 23rd of December 
' 1961, the child would have been born tween the 22nd of 
September and the 5th of October of 1962; also to the 
effect that if a boy, they generally \Vent over. Under these 
circumstances, \Vhere the child was born the 14th of Oc-
tober, which would be between the midway of the two 
normal periods for the child to have been born, based upou 
the various times the last n1enstrual period commenced, 
and with the probability that if a boy it would be over, and 
where a male child was born~ and will all hospital indica-
tions, normal, it seems that there is a strong probability 
that the conception \vas prior to the time indica ted by 
Miss Bauer. This is even more important when it is taken 
into consideration that on 2 February, 1962, 1\tliss Bauer 
was to a baskeball game in St. George between Cedar City 
and St. George, \vhich according to Coach Bruce Decker, 
was played the 2nd of February, 1962. Also, that Dr. Graff, 
on Page 224, Line 14, of the trial transcript, was asked 
questions to the effect that if an act of intercourse took 
place on the 2nd of February and conception followed 
therefrom, what would be the normal birth date of a boy, 
and he answered to the effect that it might be as late as 
November, this pertaining to the actual alleged act of 
intercourse, which \\1as claimed to have taken place the 
night Miss Bauer \vas in St. George, when she testified she 
was in Mr. Burris' apartment in Cedar City. In the event 
of an alleged act of intercourse on the 11th of February, 
which would be nine days later, this date shifts all the 
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datl'~ nine days later, on which Dr. Graff testified on Page 
:.!:.!-!, commencing Line :23, to the effect that it could be 
as late as the 9th of November, and that if a boy it might 
~u over a few days. Under these circumstances, with a 
n1ale child born on 14 October, and it was apparently nor-
mal according to hospital records, one is led to question 
the time of conception of Miss Bauer. While the testimony 
uf Dr. Graff, and to a certain extent, Dr. Williams, even 
though prejudiced, does not rule out completely the pos-
sibility of conception during the period indicated by Miss 
Bauer, it certainly shows that this was improbable. This is 
especially true when one takes into consideration that this 
testitnony \vas given sho\ving \vhat was meant by a chart 
on Page 105 of Williams on Obstetrics as revised by East-
man and Hellman 12 Edition, and \\t·here this is accepted 
as complete authority on obstetrics, and is today being 
used as the text on obstetrics and gynecology at the Uni-
,.et·sity of Utah lVIedical School. In court, part of the tes-
timony \\·as given to explain a chart on Page 103 of said 
text, and photostats of the charts in both instances have 
been entered in evidence, and the testimony, together with 
the charts, shows that there is very little probability of 
conception from either alleged act of intercourse, both of 
which acts are denied by the defendant. 'fhis defendant 
has ne\·er admitted intercourse with Miss Bauer under 
any conditions \Yhatsoever, and maintained throughout the 
trial that there \Vas no intercourse. 
10 C.J.S. on Bastardy, Section 96, Page 181, pertaining 
to the period of gestation, advances the premise that the 
('Vidence must be sufficient to show intercourse by the 
defendant \Vith the prosecutrix within the period of gesta-
tion. Under the circumstances of this matter, there is no 
probability that the alleged acts of intercourse as testi-
fied by the prosecutrix vvere \Vithin the period of gestation 
and produced the child. This rule is endorsed by the State 
of Utah by the Supreme Court thereof, in the case of 
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State vs. Steadman, 259 P. 326, 70 Utah 224; also in State 
vs. Hunt, 368 62d 263, 13 Utah 2d 32. In addition, the show-
ing of within the period of gestation is endorsed by the 
Utah Supreme Court on the following items, State vs. 
Reese, 135 P. 270, 43 Utah 447; State vs. Hammond, 148 P. 
420, 46 Utah 249, and Anderson vs. State, 238 P. 557, 65 
Utah 512. In the case of the State vs. Reeves, \vhich was 
reversed and remanded on this basis, there is a specific 
statement to this effect: 
"Before the accused can be found guilty, however, 
the State must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he had sexual intercourse with the 
prosecutrix within the period of gestation, and un-
less this is done, both his conduct and that of the 
prosecutrix outside of that period are, ordinarily, 
wholly immaterial and irrelevant." 
This should be applied to the case at bar where there is 
testimony from the prosecutrix that the alleged acts took 
place outside the normal period of gestation, where it is 
more than probable fron1 a medical standpoint that con-
ception had taken place a month earlier than the prose-
cutrix testified, where the defendant admits no intercourse 
whatsoever, and where an individual witness testified that 
at the time the alleged act of intercourse took place, the 
prosecutrix was in another situation, and where the pro-
secutrix told her parents that the alleged act of intercourse 
took place on the 9th of February, told the doctor that it 
took place on the 4th of February, swore to one complaint 
that it was between the 2nd of February and the 11th of 
February, swore to an amended complaint that it was 
on the 2nd of February and the 11th of February. Bearing 
all this in n1ind, one \vould raise the question as to \vheth-
er or not the young lady knows whether or not she at any 
time had sexual intercourse, and where in all probability 
the sexual intercourse took place a month earlier than the 
testimony of the prosecutrix. 
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One should also bear in mind that this was an item 
that had been discussed in a stnall rural community for a 
IH'riod of time in excess of the normal birth time of the 
rhild; thnt the defendant had been denied immediate trial 
and change of venue, and that the jury at no time paid 
any attention to the testimony being offered by the de-
fen~e and resented heing called upon to listen to the cross-
t':'\amination of the first \Vitness. The conviction of this de-
fendant appears to be an e·ndorsement of the age-old say-
ing, ''The minute a girl points a finger at a man, he doesn't 
ha,·c a chance." 
CONCLUSION 
That there is no evidence upon which to base a con-
\'irtion. That the evidence rather than being a preponder-
ance of evidence of the guilt of the defendant, is actually 
a preponderance of evidence of his innocence. That the de-
fendant's rights were abridged by the court. That the jury 
had a pre-conceived opinion and paid no attention to the 
e\·idence. That the Judge instructed the jury to disregard 
part of the evidence. That the defendant was denied his 
constitutional right of an immediate trial, and \vas erron-
eously denied a change of venue. Because of these errors 
the acquittal of the defendant should be ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PATRICK H. FENTON, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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